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1 Introduction
The games we analyze are the familiar n -person cooperative games with side
payments. A solution is a function f that to each game v assigns an additive
game f(v). Additive games are like (signed) measures: each player is given
a payoﬀ, and the payoﬀ to a coalition is just the sum of the payoﬀs of the
players in that coalition. Additive games are also called ”inessential games”.
A solution f has the inessential game property, if the solution to any additive
game p is that game itself: f(p) = p. A solution f is linear, if it is additive
(f(v+w) = f(v)+f(w), and satisfies f(av) = af(v) for all real numbers a.
We show that to each linear solution that has the inessential game prop-
erty, there is an inner product such that the solution to each game is the
best additive approximation of the game (w.r.t. the norm derived from this
inner product). Conversely, if the space of games has an inner product, then
the function that to each game assigns the best additive approximation of
this game (w.r.t. to the norm derived from this inner product) is a linear
solution that has the inessential game property. Both claims remain valid
also if solutions are required to be eﬃcient.
Some of the best known solutions for cooperative games, such as the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, satisfy linearity and have the inessential
game property. Classes of solutions such as semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and
Weber (1981) and least square values (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1996,
1998)) satisfy these conditions as well. So all these solutions can be viewed
as ”minimum norm solutions”. Given a norm on the space of games, the
minimum norm solution to a game is the solution that is closest to the game
w.r.t. the norm. In this paper we consider only such norms that can be
derived from some inner product.
Minimum norm solutions have some intuitive appeal. A game v specifies
the worth of each coalition. Potential solutions to a game are additive games.
Find the additive game p that is as close as possible to the given game v.
Then the payoﬀs pi to players i should reflect the importance of these players
in v as well as possible. If the norm is changed, then another solution p0 to
v is found. Something like this may happen in real world as well: if social
norms change, then the characteristics of individuals that earlier were deemed
valuable may become less valuable.
The additivity property of solutions has received some criticism in the
literature. But this property is unavoidable if we seek for minimum norm
solutions since linear solutions are additive. Therefore, if we don’t accept
additivity, we cannot find the idea behind the minimum norm solutions very
interesting either. Conversely, if linearity is accepted as a reasonable axiom,
then minimum norm solutions should be accepted as well. (Unless, of course,
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one feels strongly that the inessential game property is counterintuitive.)
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 notation is
introduced. In Section 3 we mainly review some results about least square
solutions. The main results are given in Section 4. Section 4 contains some
results concerning the core.
2 Preliminaries
Given a nonempty finite player set N = {1, . . . , n}, an n -person cooperative
game is a function v that assigns to each coalition S ⊂ N a real number v(S)
with the convention v(∅) = 0. Hence a game v may be viewed as a vector in
the linear space R2N−1. We denote by vi the coordinate of v corresponding to
the singleton coalition {i}. We denote by V the space R2N−1 of all n -person
games. The origin of V is denoted by 0¯.
An inner product on V is a function h·, ·i : V×V −→ R such that for all
games v, v0, w: (1) hv, wi = hw, vi; (2) hav + bv0, wi = ahv, wi + bhv0, wi, for
all a, b ∈ R; (3) hv, vi ≥ 0; (4) hv, vi = 0 implies v = 0¯. If the condition (4) is
not satisfied, then h·, ·i is a semi inner product. A norm (seminorm) k · k on
V can be defined from an inner product (semi inner product) h·, ·i by kvk =phv, vi. A metric (semimetric) d can be defined from a norm (seminorm) by
d(v, w) = kv − wk. Interpreting v as a column vector, its transpose vT is a
row vector. Then the usual dot product vTw =
P
S⊂N v(S)w(S) is an inner
product. The norm derived from this inner product is the Euclidean norm,
and the metric derived from this norm is the Euclidean metric.
A game v ∈ V is additive, if v(S) =
P
i∈S vi, for all S ⊂ N . We denote
by A the set of all additive n -person games, and note that it is a linear
subspace of V. A game v ∈ V is superadditive, if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ),
when S∩T = ∅. Additive games are superadditive. A game v ∈ V is convex,
if v(S)− v(S \ {i}) ≥ v(T )− v(T \ {i}), for all i ∈ N and for all coalitions
S, T such that i ∈ T ⊂ S. Convex games are superadditive. A game v ∈ V
is monotone, if v(S) ≤ v(T ), when S ⊂ T . Monotone games are positive
(v(S) ≥ 0, for allS), and positive superadditive games are monotone.
A solution to n -person cooperative games is a function f : V −→ A that
to each game v associates an additive game f(v). The best-known solution
is the Shapley value φ:
φ(v)i =
X
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})],
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for all i ∈ N , where s = |S| denotes the cardinality of coalition S. Let
π : N −→ N be any bijection. To each v ∈ V define a game πv by
πv(π(S)) = v(S), for all S ⊂ N , where π(S) = {π(i) | i ∈ S}. The
Shapley value is the only solution f on V satisfying the following four condi-
tions (Shapley 1953; Winter 2002). The conditions must hold for every game
v ∈ V, but we don’t repeat this in the statements of the conditions.
A1. (Eﬃciency) f(v)(N) = v(N).
A2. (Anonymity) f(πv)π(i) = f(v)i, for all i ∈ N , and any bijection
π : N −→ N .
A3. (Dummy) If v(S)− v(S \ {i}) = 0 for all S ⊂ N , then f(v)i = 0.
A4. (Additivity) f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w).
Another well-known solution is the Banzhaf value β:
β(v)i =
1
2n−1
X
S3i
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})],
for all i ∈ N . It satisfies all the properties mentioned above except eﬃciency.
Both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy the following linearity
condition, which is a bit stronger than additivity.
A5. (Linearity) f(av + bw) = af(v) + bf(w), for all a, b ∈ R.
Both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy the following con-
dition.
A6. (Inessential game) f(v) = v, for all additive games v.
We need also the following axioms in the sequel.
A7. (Coalitional mononicity) If v(S) > w(S) and v(T ) = w(T ) for all
T 6= S, then f(v)i ≥ f(w)i for all i ∈ S.
A8. (Positivity) If v is monotonic, then f(v) ≥ 0¯.
The core C(v) of a game v consists of additive games x ∈ A such that
x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N . In general the core may be
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empty, but the Shapley value is in the core of any convex game.
3 Least square values
Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1996, 1998) study least square values, which
they define in the following way. Let m ∈ V be a nonnegative game (vector)
such that m(S) > 0 for some S, and m(S) = m(T ) if |S| = |T |. Given a
game v ∈ V and weights m, the least square value Lm solves the following
minimization problem;
Min
X
S⊂N
m(S)(v(S)− x(S))2, s.t. x ∈ A, x(N) = v(N) (1)
A solution is a least square value, if and only if it satisfies eﬃciency, linearity,
symmetry, inessential game, and coalitional monotonicity (Ruiz, Valenciano
and Zarzuelo 1998, Theorem 8, p.116). (Symmetry is a slightly weaker con-
dition than anonymity: the result is true also if symmetry is replaced by
anonymity.)
A semivalue (Dubey, Neyman and Weber 1981) is a solution that satisfies
linearity, anonymity, inessential game and positivity. If f is a semivalue, then
it gives player i ∈ N the payoﬀ
f(v)i =
X
S 63i
p(S)[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)],
where p is a probability measure over coalitions S 6= N such that |S| = |T |
implies p(S) = p(T ).
Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1998, p. 120) observe that the additive
normalization of a semivalue is in fact a least square value. That is, if f is a
semivalue, then f˜(v) = f(v)+ [v(N)− f(v)(N)]/n is the additive normaliza-
tion of f , and f˜ is a least square value. They also remark that there are least
square values Lm that cannot be derived from any semivalue in this way.
If the weights for all coalitions are the same, then the solution to formula
(1) minimizes the Euclidean distance between v and the set of all additive
games x such that v(N) =
P
i∈N xi. So we can interpret the least square
value as being the best additive approximation of a given game v.
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Similar interpretation applies also when the weights for coalitions of dif-
ferent sizes are not equal. In this case the distance between games is not
given by the Euclidean metric but by some other metric. To see this, let M
be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal element corresponding to the coali-
tion S is MS,S = m(S). Interpret games x ∈ V as column vectors and their
transposes xT as row vectors. Then hx, yi = xTMy defines a semi inner
product on V from which a seminorm k · k can be derived as explained in the
previous section. Then Lm(v) minimizes kv − pk among all additive p such
that p(N) = v(N).
Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo oﬀer a diﬀerent interpretation for the least
square values. Their interpretation is related to another solution concept, the
nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). Given a game v, the excess for coalition S at
x ∈ A is given by e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S). Let e(x) be the average of the
excesses of all coalitions, and minimize
P
S⊂N m(S)(e(S, x)−e(x))2, s.t. x ∈
A, x(N) = v(N). Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo note that in fact the solution
to this problem is the same as the solution to the problem given in formula
(1), so they minimize the (weighted) sum of squared excesses. The nucleolus,
on the other hand, is found by minimizing lexicographically the maximal
excess among all coalitions, and the solution is searched from the set of all
imputations: x ∈ A, x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ vi, for all i ∈ N .
3.1 Banzhaf, Shapley and least square values
Let us seek the least square solution for games, when the weights for all
coalitions are the same in formula (1), and denote this solution by L. So
we may set these weights equal to unity, and our problem is to find the
solution L(v) ∈ A that minimizes the inner product (v − p)T (v − p) subject
to p ∈ A, p(N) = v(N).
Let us denote by A⊥ the orthogonal complement of A with respect to the
dot product. That is, A⊥ = {v ∈ V | vTp = 0, for all p ∈ A}. Any game
v ∈ V can be uniquely expressed as the sum v = v⊥ + pv, where v⊥ ∈ A⊥
and pv ∈ A.
Since pv is by definition the additive game that is closest to v, the
Pythagorean Theorem says that L(v) is the orthogonal projection of pv on
the linear manifoldM = {p ∈ A | p(N) = v(N)}. (Note that the additivity of
L follows immediately from this observation, since projections into subspaces
are linear mappings.)
So L(v) = p, where p minimizes the dot product (p − pv)T (p − pv). In
other words, the additive game L(v) − pv is closest to the origin among all
additive games in the linear manifoldM 0 = {p ∈ A | p(N) = v(N)− pv(N)}.
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By symmetry of the Euclidean norm, L(v)− pv = (v(N)− pv(N))u, where u
is the uniform additive game: u(S) = s/n for all S ⊂ N .
In words, L(v)i is obtained by adding the amount [v(N) − pv(N)]/n to
pvi . Since L is additive, and v = v
⊥+ pv, we have L(v⊥) = (v(N)− pv(N))u.
So the value L(v⊥) is obtained by dividing the sum v⊥(N) evenly between
players.
The Banzhaf value β is additive, and satisfies β(p) = p for all additive
games p. Hence β(v) = β(v⊥) + pv. Let us calculate β(v⊥). Define for
each i ∈ N the additive game δi by δi(S) = 1 if i ∈ S, and δi(S) = 0
if i /∈ S. Since (v⊥)T δi = 0 and (v⊥)T δi =
P
S3i v
⊥(S)for all i, we have
that
P
S⊂N v
⊥(S) =
P
S3i[v
⊥(S) + v⊥(S \ {i})] =PS3i[v⊥(S \ {i})]. Hence
−
P
S3i v
⊥(S\{i}) = −PS⊂N v⊥(S). So the Banzhaf value satisfies β(v⊥)i =
−21−n
P
S⊂N v
⊥(S), i.e.
β(v⊥) =
−n
2n−1
[
X
S⊂N
v⊥(S)]u (2)
That is, the Banzhaf value of v⊥ divides the sum −n
2n−1 [
P
S⊂N v
⊥(S)] evenly
between players. Define the additive normalization β˜ of the Banzhaf value
by β˜(v)i = β(v)i+[v(N)−β(v)(N)]/n, for all games v and all players i ∈ N .
Then β˜ is clearly additive, and satisfies β˜(p) = p, for additive games p. So
β˜(v) = β˜(v⊥)+pv. But β˜(v⊥) divides the sum v⊥(N) evenly between players,
as does the least square value L(v⊥). We have
Theorem 1 L = β˜.
Theorem 1 follows from the more general Theorem 12 by Ruiz, Valen-
ciano and Zarzuelo (1998), but we gave a separate (and diﬀerent) proof for
completeness, and to help the reader to understand our results in the next
section. Let us solve pv, the orthogonal projection of v onto A.
Since v⊥ = v− pv and (v⊥)T δi = 0 we have (v− pv)T δi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
That is, X
S3i
v(S) =
X
S3i
pv(S), for all i ∈ N (3)
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But i belongs to 2n−1 coalitions, and each j 6= i belongs to exactly half of
these coalitions. HenceX
S3i
pv(S) = 2n−1pvi + 2
n−2pv(N \ {i}) (4)
because
P
S⊂N p(S) = 2
n−1p(N) for all additive games p. Equations (3) and
(4) imply
pvi =
1
2n−2
X
S3i
v(S)− pv(N), for all i ∈ N (5)
Summing up the equations in (5), we get
pv(N) =
1
(n+ 1)2n−2
nX
i=1
X
S3i
v(S) (6)
Therefore by equations (4) and (5), we have
pvi =
1
(n+ 1)2n−2
[(n+ 1)
X
S3i
v(S)−
nX
j=1
X
S3j
v(S)] (7)
The additive normalization β˜ of the Banzhaf value is obtained by adding the
same constant to each players’ pvi given by (7). This is also the least square
value by Theorem 1. The ordinary Banzhaf value β is obtained by adding
another constant (but the same for all players) to the values pvi given by (7).
Note that pvi < p
v
j for i 6= j if and only if
P
S3i v(S) <
P
S3j v(S). This has
the following implications to the theory of voting games and power indices.
Recall that a game v is simple, if v(S) = 0 or v(S) = 1, for all S ⊂ N .
The coalitions S such that v(S) = 1 are called winning coalitions, and the
remaining coalitions are called losing. If v is simple, then
P
S3i v(S) is the
number of those winning coalitions that include i. Solutions defined on simple
games are usually called power indices. Best known power indices are the
Shapley-Shubik index, and the Banzhaf power index. These are just the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value restricted to simple games. The least
square values Lm and the additive normalization β˜ of the Banzhaf value
would also qualify as power indices, when restricted to simple games.
Theorem 2 Let P be any power index such that for all simple games v and
all players i, j ∈ N , P (v)i < P (v)j if and only if the number of winning
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coalitions containing j is strictly greater than the number of winning coali-
tions containing i. Then for all simple games v and all players i, j ∈ N ,
P (v)i < P (v)j if and only if β(v)i < β(v)j.
From formula of the Banzhaf value, β(v)i = 12n−1
P
S3i[v(S)− v(S \ {i})],
it is clear that β(v)i < β(v)j, if j has more swings. That is, there are more
coalitions S for j such that S is winning but S \{j} is loosing, than there are
such coalitions for i. The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem
2.
Corollary 1
P
S3i v(S) <
P
S3j v(S) if and only if j has more swings than
i in the simple game v.
Keane (1969) solved the minimization problem (1), and calculated the
weights m(S) for coalitions S such that the solution is the Shapley value.
These weights are given the following:
m(S) =
(n− s− 1)!(s− 1)!
(n− 1)! , S 6= N.
The weight m(N) of the grand coalition turns out to be irrelevant in the
minimization problem (1). Note that in three person games, these weights are
the same for all coalitions, and therefore the Shapley value and the additive
normalization of the Banzhaf value are the same on these games. Hence by
Theorem 1, L = φ on three person games.
4 Main results
Given an inner product h·, ·i on V, consider the following problem for each
v ∈ V.
Minhv − p, v − pi, s.t. p ∈ A, p(N) = v(N). (8)
This is of course the same as minimizing the norm kv−pk =phv − p, v − pi
with the same restrictions.
Theorem 3 For each v ∈ V, the solution f(v) to the problem (8) exists
uniquely. The function f : V −→ A is eﬃcient, linear and has the inessential
game property.
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Proof. Choose v ∈ V arbitrarily. Let M(v) = {p ∈ A | p(N) = v(N)},
and note that M(v) is a linear manifold in A. By the Classical Projection
Theorem (Luenberger 1969, p.51), the programme (8) has a unique solution
f(v), and f(v) is the only p ∈M(v) having the property
hv − p, q − pi = 0, for all q ∈M(v) (9)
The solution f is eﬃcient by definition. If p ∈ A and w = v+ p, then clearly
f(w) = f(v) + p, so f has the inessential game property.
Let w = v+v0 for some v0 ∈ V.We want to show that f(w) = f(v)+f(v0),
to establish additivity of f . So it suﬃces to show that equation (9) holds for
all q ∈M(w), when v in that equation is replaced by v+ v0 and p is replaced
by f(v) + f(v0). Take an arbitrary p ∈ M(v), and note that q − p ∈ M(v0),
when q ∈M(w). Similarly, q− p0 ∈M(v) when q ∈M(w), p0 ∈M(v0).With
these substitutions, the left hand side of equation (9) gets the following form:
hv + v0 − f(v) − f(v0), q − f(v) − f(v0)i = hv − f(v), q − f(v) − f(v0)i +
hv0 − f(v0), q − f(v)− f(v0)i.
The first term of the sum on the right hand side of this equation is zero,
because q − f(v0) ∈ M(v) and f(v) solves (8) for v. The second term of
the sum is also zero, because q − f(v) ∈ M(v0) and f(v0) solves (8) for v0.
Therefore f is additive.
If w = av for some a ∈ R, then obviously f(w) = af(v), and therefore f
is linear. Q.E.D.
Note that if we solve the problem (8) without demanding eﬃciency p(N) =
v(N), the solution would be the orthogonal projection p(v) of v into A with
respect to the inner product h·, ·i. The solution f(v) of (8) is then obtained
by taking the orthogonal projection of p(v) w.r.t. h·, ·i into M(v) = {p ∈ A |
p(N) = v(N)}.
Our next result states that to any linear solution f that has the inessential
game property, there is an inner product h·, ·i such that f(v) solves (8) for
all games v.
Theorem 4 Let f : V −→ A be any linear solution that has the inessential
game property. Then there is an inner product h·, ·i such that f(v) solves (8)
for all games v ∈ V.
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Proof. Recall that A⊥ is the orthogonal complement of A w.r.t. the dot
product, and that v can be expressed as a sum v = v⊥ + pv in a unique
way, v⊥ ∈ A⊥, pv ∈ A. The projection map v −→ v⊥ is linear, so there is a
matrix Q such that Qv = v⊥ for all v ∈ V. The matrix Q is symmetric and
idempotent: QT = Q, QQ = Q, for all games v (see Luenberger 1969).
Since f is a linear solution, it has a matrix F : Fv = f(v), for all games
v. Define
hv, wi = vT [F TF +Q]w, for all games v, w ∈ V. (10)
This is an inner product, since the matrix F TF+Q is symmetric and positive
definite. Symmetry is clear, so let us check positive definiteness. Let v be any
game such that v(S) 6= 0 for at least one coalition S. Then vT [F TF +Q]v =
f(v)Tf(v) + (v⊥)Tv⊥ ≥ 0. The value is exactly zero only if f(v) = 0¯ and
v⊥ = 0¯. If v⊥ = 0¯, then v ∈ A, but in this case f(v) = v since f has the
inessential game property, so f(v) 6= 0¯. Therefore vT [F TF + Q]v > 0, and
h·, ·i is an inner product on V.
Take any game v. Then
hv − f(v), v − f(v)i = f(v − f(v))Tf(v − f(v)) + (v⊥)Tv⊥ = (v⊥)Tv⊥,
since f is linear and has the inessential game property. If p 6= f(v) is an
arbitrary additive game, then
hv − p, v − pi = (f(v)− p)T (f(v)− p) + (v⊥)Tv⊥.
Hence hv − f(v), v − f(v)i < hv − p, v − pi, if p 6= f(v), and f(v) solves the
problem (8). Q.E.D.
5 Least square values and the core
The following example shows that the least square value L is not always in
the core of a convex game.
EXAMPLE 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and define v in the following way.
For single person coalitions, vi = 0 for i < 4, and v4 = 1. If S ⊂ {1, 2, 3}
and |S| > 1, then v(S) = −5 + 4|S|. If 4 ∈ S and S 6= N , then v(S) =
v(S\{4})+1. The value of the grand coalition is v(N) = v({1, 2, 3})+1+1/4.
10
The marginal contribution v(S)−v(S\{i}) is nondecreasing in S for each
player i, so v is convex. The Banzhaf values are β(v)i = (20 + 1/4)/8 for
i < 4, and β4 = (8+1/4)/8. The least square values for players are calculated
by L(v)i = β(v)i + [v(N)− β(v)(N)]/4. These values are L(v)i = 39/16 for
i < 4, and L(v)4 = 15/16. Since L(v)4 = 15/16 < 1 = v4, L(v) is not in the
core of v.
Let C(v) be the core of the game v. The core satisfies the additivity
condition C(v+w) = C(v)+C(w), if both C(v) and C(w) are nonempty. If
C(v) 6= ∅, then C(v+ p) = C(v)+{p} for any additive game p, since C(p) =
{p} for additive games. Recall that v = v⊥+pv, and that L(v) = L(v⊥)+pv.
So if L(v) /∈ C(v), this happens because L(v⊥) /∈ C(v⊥). Since L divides the
sum v⊥(N) evenly among the players, L(v⊥)(S) = sv⊥(N)/n < v⊥(S) for
some S, iﬀ L(v) /∈ C(v).
One could modify the least square value L so that it picks an element
from the core whenever the core is nonempty, and if the core is empty then
the solution is given by the usual least square value. A natural candidate for
this kind a modified least square value is such that it picks the core element
that is closest to the game with respect to the Euclidean norm. That is, if
C(v) 6= ∅, then the minimization problem is the following
Min
X
S⊂N
(v(S)− x(S))2, s.t. x ∈ C(v) (11)
Since C(v) is convex and compact, a unique solution to this problem always
exists. Define the modified least square value Lˆ by Lˆ(v) solves (11) if C(v) 6=
∅, and Lˆ(v) = L(v) otherwise.
By the Pythagorean Theorem, the solution to (11) can be found by first
solving L(v), and then finding the point x ∈ C(v) that is closest to L(v).
Then x = Lˆ(v). Since L(v) = L(v⊥) + pv, the solution can also be found
by finding first y ∈ C(v⊥) that is closest to L(v⊥), and then y + pv = Lˆ(v).
Recall that L(v⊥) = v⊥(N)u, where u is the uniform additive game. Hence
y = Lˆ(v⊥) is the point in C(v⊥) that is closest to the equal division of the
worth v⊥(N).
One can show that Lˆ(v⊥) is actually a Lorenz undominated member of
the core of v⊥ in the sense of Dutta and Ray (1989). Moreover, if v is convex
then v⊥ is convex, and Lˆ(v⊥) Lorenz dominates every other member of C(v⊥).
But the Dutta-Ray solution (the set of Lorenz undominated members of the
11
core) is not additive. Namely, the Dutta-Ray solution of a convex game v
need not be the same as Lˆ(v⊥)+pv, although Lˆ(v⊥) is the Dutta-Ray solution
of v⊥ and pv obviously is the Dutta-Ray solution of pv. The modified least
square value Lˆ has the property Lˆ(v + p) = Lˆ(v) + p, if p ∈ A, although it
doesn’t satisfy additivity either.
12
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